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PROVIDING PLAINTIFFS WITH TOOLS:
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EEOC V.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
Michelle Letourneau*
INTRODUCTION
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employers are
required to provide individuals with disabilities “reasonable accommodations,”1 including reassignment of a current employee to a vacant job position2 should the employee find himself or herself unable to perform the
essential functions of her current job due to a disability, but is able to fulfill
the functions of the vacant position with or without reasonable accommodation.3 Traditionally, circuit courts have been split on whether “reassignment”
means automatic reassignment or simply the opportunity to compete for the
position against other applicants.4 The only Supreme Court case on the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.A. in Music
Performance and Anthropology, University of Notre Dame, 2012. I would like to thank my
advisor, Professor Michael Jenuwine, for help in developing the thesis of this Note,
numerous helpful conversations, and draft reviews. I would also like to thank Professor
Barbara Fick for lengthy discussions, which led me to adopt the particular approach and
thesis of this Note. I would also like to thank Kay Halvorson, Nikki Harris, Laura
Dettinger, and Warren Rees for their guidance in checking for preemption, which also led
me to adopt the approach and thesis of this Note. I would like to thank Barry Taylor for
suggesting this topic, and Rachel Margolis Weisberg for providing an idea for
incorporating mental illness and/or mental disability into the Note. I would like to thank
Ben Risacher for his review of an initial draft and all of the Notre Dame Law Review members
who so carefully and generously edited this Note. I would like to thank my roommate,
Karen Campion, for discussing the Note with me as I developed my ideas aloud and for
providing useful questions and ideas during that development. I would like to thank my
friends and family for their support. Finally, I would like to thank Ryan Belock for
designing the “Reassignment Spectrum” graphic and for his endless support and
encouragement throughout the entire writing and revising process.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2012).
2 Id. § 12111(9)(B).
3 See id. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2014).
4 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007); Mays v.
Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2002), abrogated by EEOC v. United Airlines Inc.
(United Airlines II), 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d
1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760; Smith v. Midland
1373
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issue, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,5 holds that ADA reassignment is not ordinarily reasonable where the employer has an established seniority system.6
Using the reasoning of that Supreme Court case, the Seventh Circuit
seems to have clarified its position regarding whether reassignment is
mandatory despite an employer’s policy of selecting the best qualified candidate for a position.7 In March 2012, a three-judge Seventh Circuit panel published an opinion in the case of EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. (United Airlines
I).8 In September 2012, the same panel vacated its own March opinion and
wrote a new opinion (United Airlines II), overruling and abrogating Seventh
Circuit precedents9 holding that a most-qualified selection policy may
“trump” ADA reassignment.10 The Seventh Circuit likely did make
mandatory reassignment ordinarily reasonable under the Barnett test.11
While commentators have discussed the Seventh Circuit’s contribution to the
circuit split on this question,12 the real contributions of United Airlines II were
to temper what could have been a relatively employer-friendly decision in
Barnett and to provide employees with tools to argue that reassignment is
ordinarily reasonable despite many types of employment policies. In fact, the
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156
F.3d 1284, 1300–01 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
5 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 538 (2013) (“The only
Supreme Court case addressing the reasonable accommodation provision is U.S. Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett.”).
6 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394; Porter, supra note 5, at 538; Kerri Stone, Substantial Limitations: Reflections on the ADAAA, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 520–21 (2011).
7 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 762–65.
8 EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. (United Airlines I), 673 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2012),
vacated, United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760.
9 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 761, 763–64. Recently, another note was published on
the topic of this Note. See Michael Creta, Note, The Accommodation of Last Resort: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Reassignments, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1693 (2014). While I also argue
that United Airlines II has most likely established that mandatory reassignment trumps bestqualified policies under the Barnett analysis, I develop the likelihood of this conclusion in
more detail and argue explicitly that this likely conclusion helps plaintiffs to regain ground
under a Barnett framework which had heightened the burden on plaintiffs to prove reasonableness. In fact, Creta may conflate the reasonableness and undue hardship analyses. See
id. at 1707 n.99. I also explicitly state and argue that language from United Airlines II can be
used by plaintiffs to argue that mandatory reassignment should be able to trump other
employment policies besides best-qualified policies, see id. at 1726–28, even the limitations
which are explicitly stated in Midland Brake and may be lauded by Creta, see id. at 1722 &
n.197.
10 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763 (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405).
11 See Valerie Wicks, 7th Circuit Reverses Course; Reassignment May Be ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ Under ADA, WESTLAW J. EMP. (Thomson Reuters, Wayne, PA), Jan. 2013, at *2.
12 See Taylor Brooke Concannon, Comment, Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the
Bathwater: Taking the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc. Too Far, 52
WASHBURN L.J. 613, 634 & n.174 (2013); Kevin P. McGowan, Justices Decline to Review ADA
Case on Duty to Reassign Disabled Employees, BNA’S EMP. DISCRIMINATION REP. (Arlington,
VA), June 2013, at 868–70.
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language of United Airlines II may be even more useful to plaintiffs than preBarnett decisions from other circuits that had rejected the notion that a bestqualified selection policy could trump a reasonable request for reassignment
under the ADA.
This Note will analyze the language of the United Airlines II decision, in
light of Barnett, Seventh Circuit precedents regarding the reasonable accommodation of reassignment, and cases from other circuits that the Seventh
Circuit cited in relevant part in its United Airlines II decision. Part I will provide an introduction to the relevant provisions of the ADA. Part II will summarize relevant portions of a series of cases predating United Airlines II that
deal with the concept of reassignment as a reasonable accommodation under
the ADA. These cases are discussed in considerable detail in order to highlight in Part III the significance of United Airlines II—particularly for
employee-plaintiffs trying to argue that ADA reassignment should ordinarily
trump various employment policies.
I.

THE AMERICANS

WITH

DISABILITIES ACT

Recognizing that individuals with disabilities have experienced discrimination in the United States but traditionally had “no legal recourse to redress
such discrimination,”13 Congress enacted the ADA in 1990.14 The purpose
of the Act was to ensure federal recourse for such discrimination by
“provid[ing] clear, strong, consistent, enforceable [national] standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”15
Based on similar findings and purposes, the ADA was amended in 2008
in order to expand the definition of “disability.”16 By doing so, Congress
emphasized that “the primary object of attention in cases brought under the
ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with
their obligations” rather than “extensive analysis” of “whether an individual’s
impairment is a disability under the ADA.”17 One such obligation is that
employers not discriminate against applicants or employees with
disabilities.18
Title I of the ADA addresses discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the employment setting: “No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.”19 “Covered entit[ies]” include “an employer, employment
13 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (2012).
14 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213).
15 42 U.SC. § 12101(b)(1)–(2).
16 Id. § 12102(1).
17 Id. § 12101(b).
18 Id. § 12112(a)–(b).
19 Id. § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
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agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee,”20 where
an “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agent of such person.”21 A “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”22 Discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” includes
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who
is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee
who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is
based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to
the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant.23

In short, under the ADA, employers are required to provide reasonable
accommodations to applicants or employees with disabilities unless the
employer can prove undue hardship.24 The ADA provides a definition and
list of factors to consider when evaluating whether undue hardship exists,
including “the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved
in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
employed at such facility; [and] the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility.”25 The
EEOC also states in its ADA regulations that “[i]t may be a defense to a
charge of discrimination . . . that a challenged action is required or necessitated by another Federal law or regulation, or that another Federal law or
regulation prohibits an action (including the provision of a particular reasonable accommodation).”26
A nonexhaustive list of possible accommodations is outlined in the ADA
and includes “reassignment to a vacant position.”27 This accommodation has
been surrounded by controversy over the years, resulting in a circuit split and
a shift in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence. Why is this particular accommodation so controversial? One might speculate. All of the potential reasonable
accommodations listed explicitly in the ADA besides “reassignment” seem to
be aimed at enabling an individual with a disability to perform the essential
functions of her assigned position. The “reassignment” accommodation
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id. § 12111(2).
Id. § 12111(5)(A).
Id. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (emphasis added).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
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seems to be the only one that considers essential functions outside of the
assigned position. In fact, the EEOC regulations set particular boundaries
for the expectations surrounding this accommodation—one of the few
accommodations that “require further explanation.”28 For example, employers are usually able to exercise significant discretion in selecting among
accommodations when multiple reasonable accommodations are available.29
However, the accommodation of reassignment is only available to employees,
not to applicants,30 and only after possible accommodations for the
employee in her current position have been considered and/or rejected.31
Then, the employer must first consider the employee for any equivalent
vacant positions before considering “a lower graded position.”32 However,
the “employer is not required to promote an individual with a disability as an
accommodation.”33 Despite such attempts by the EEOC to clarify the expectations and borders of the “reassignment” provision, questions still remain
regarding the “scope of the employer’s obligation to offer . . . a reassignment
job” to an individual with a disability.34 More specifically, courts have tried to
determine when reassignment is “reasonable,”35 particularly in light of an
employer’s other employment policies.36
The Supreme Court considered this question and held in 2002 that
when considering reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, the
employee must first establish that the reassignment would be “reasonable in
the run of cases,” in light of an employer’s other employment policies.37 If
this first step results in a presumption that an employer’s employment policy
would ordinarily prevail over the ADA reassignment provision,38 the
employee “nonetheless remains free to show that special circumstances warrant a finding” that reassignment is reasonable in this case.39 Only after the
employee-plaintiff has shown reasonableness, either “in the run of cases” or
in this particular case, will the court consider whether the employer has a
valid undue hardship defense.40 The Court specifically rejected the plain28 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1159 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
35 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012); see Charles Conway, Ordinarily
Reasonable: Using the Supreme Court’s Barnett Analysis to Clarify Preferential Treatment Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721, 727 (2014) (“Since
its enactment, the ADA’s ‘reasonable accommodations’ requirement has perplexed
employees and employers. The ADA’s vague language has led to many unresolved issues as
employers, employees, and courts have interpreted the ambiguous terms of the statute in
different ways.” (footnotes omitted)).
36 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002).
37 Id. at 403.
38 Id. at 406.
39 Id. at 405.
40 See id. at 400–02.
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tiff’s contention that a showing of “reasonableness” merely required a showing of the “effectiveness” of the accommodation for the employee.41
However, it remains unclear exactly what constitutes “reasonable.”42
In the Seventh Circuit, ADA reassignment controversy has primarily concerned whether and when ADA reassignment should trump an employer’s
best-qualified selection policy.43 In 2000, a court held that an employer
could assign the most qualified applicant to a position, despite the reassignment provision of the ADA.44 In 2002, in light of Barnett, the Seventh Circuit
held that it was reasonable for a best-qualified policy to trump the ADA reassignment provision.45 However, in its September 2012 United Airlines II opinion, the Seventh Circuit vacated its March 2012 United Airlines I opinion,46
overruled its 2000 holding, and abrogated its 2002 holding.47 While a seniority system might presumptively trump the ADA reassignment requirement,48
a best-qualified selection policy cannot be equated with a seniority policy.49
Through this conclusion and the language that the Seventh Circuit chose to
use from the Barnett case, the Seventh Circuit helped to soften Barnett’s
“blow” to employee-plaintiffs—its requirement that plaintiffs show more than
“effectiveness” to meet their burden of proving “reasonableness” in the first
step of the reasonable accommodation analysis. The Seventh Circuit has provided employee-plaintiffs with valuable language and considerations to argue
that a particular accommodation is “reasonable,” even under the Barnett analysis and the unclear definition of “reasonableness.”
II.
A.

CASE ANALYSES

Aka v. Washington Hospital Center50

After undergoing bypass surgery, Etim U. Aka was unable to perform the
orderly job at Washington Hospital Center (WHC) he had held for nineteen
years.51 Aka requested reassignment to a new position, but the hospital
required Aka to investigate and apply for positions on his own;52 WHC gave
Aka an eighteen-month “job search leave,” during which he would continue
to benefit from the collective bargaining agreement which “provide[d] that
41 Id. at 399–402.
42 See Porter, supra note 5, at 529–32.
43 See United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012).
44 EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028–29 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled
by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760.
45 Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2002), abrogated by United Airlines II, 693
F.3d 760.
46 United Airlines I, 673 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated, United Airlines II, 693 F.3d
760.
47 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763–64.
48 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002).
49 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 764.
50 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
51 Id. at 1286.
52 Id.
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qualified WHC employees ‘[would] be given preferential treatment over
nonHospital employees in filling bargaining unit vacancies,’ and also incorporate[d] an additional preference for employees with greater seniority.”53
Aka applied for various positions but was not hired and in some cases was not
even interviewed.54 Aka filed complaints under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and the ADA;55 the ADA claim included two theories: disparate treatment and failure to provide “the reasonable accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position once he became disabled.”56
In evaluating the reasonable accommodation claim, the D.C. Circuit first
analyzed the meaning of “otherwise qualified.” Examining the language of
the ADA, caselaw, the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines, and the legislative history of the ADA, the court held, “[a]n employee seeking reassignment to a
vacant position is thus within the definition [of ‘otherwise qualified’] if, with
or without reasonable accommodation, she can perform the essential functions of the employment position to which she seeks reassignment.”57
Next, the court examined the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
Based on a plain language reading of section 14.5,58 the court determined
that the CBA allowed reassignment of “disabled employees to vacant positions in at least some circumstances”59 and that “reassignment” under section
14.5 meant more than simply allowing an employee to compete for a vacant
job.60 Though the court could not determine whether the CBA and ADA
were perfectly aligned or “what would occur” if they were in conflict,61 it did
observe—in response to the dissent—that the ADA’s reassignment provision
also requires more than “[a]n employee who on his own initiative applies for
and obtains a job elsewhere in the enterprise.”62 The court also made some
observations about limitations to ADA reassignment, which were comparable
to those outlined in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.63
B.

Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.64

In Midland Brake, the Tenth Circuit en banc categorically rejected the
notion that a best-qualified hiring policy could trump a reasonable reassignment under the ADA. After seven years of working in the light assembly
department at Midland Brake, Robert Smith “developed muscular injuries
and chronic dermatitis on his hands,” rendering him “unfit to work in the
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 1286–87.
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1300–01.
Id. at 1302–03.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1301, 1303.
Id. at 1305
Id.; see infra Section II.B.
180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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light assembly department.”65 Unable to accommodate Smith in the light
assembly department, Midland Brake eventually fired Mr. Smith.66 The
Tenth Circuit found that summary judgment was not appropriate because a
material issue of fact remained “regarding whether Smith sufficiently invoked
the interactive process and, if so, whether Midland Brake adequately
responded to a request for reassignment,”67 and remanded the case to the
district court.68 However, the Tenth Circuit en banc clearly rejected the earlier finding that an employee could not be considered a “qualified individual
with a disability” because he could not “perform his existing job”69 if the
employee “could perform the essential functions of other available jobs
within the company with or without a reasonable accommodation.”70
The Tenth Circuit provided an analysis of—and limitations to—“an
employer’s duty to reassign.”71 After determining that “reassignment”
applies to “an existing employee, not a job applicant,” the court rejected the
dissent’s suggestion “that the reassignment duty imposed by the ADA is no
more than a duty merely to consider without discrimination a disabled
employee’s request for reassignment along with all other applications.”72
The court ultimately held that:
If no reasonable accommodation can keep the employee in his or her
existing job, then the reasonable accommodation may require reassignment
to a vacant position so long as the employee is qualified for the job and it
does not impose an undue burden on the employer. Anything more, such
as requiring the reassigned employee to be the best qualified employee for
the vacant job, is judicial gloss [or “an additional exception”] unwarranted
by the statutory language or its legislative history.73

While the presence of a more qualified candidate could not be a factor
that would preclude a “right to reassign,”74 the court did list factors which
could preclude a duty of reassignment.75 First, the court emphasized that
reassignment is only to be considered if it is not possible to accommodate the
65 Id. at 1160.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1179.
68 Id. at 1180. The parties were permitted to submit, and the district court could consider, other claims for summary judgment. Id. The district court did consider such a
claim—regarding whether Smith had shown he was qualified to perform a vacant position
despite “sworn assertions to the [Social Security Administration] that he was permanently
and totally disabled”—but again found that summary judgment was not appropriate; the
case was later dismissed (and presumably settled). Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 2d 1233, 1239, 1242 (D. Kan. 2000).
69 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1159–60.
70 Id. at 1159.
71 Id. at 1171.
72 Id. at 1164 (emphasis added). The court cited the plain language of the statute. Id.
at 1164–66.
73 Id. at 1167, 1169.
74 Id. at 1166.
75 Id. at 1170–78.
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employee in her current position.76 Next, and very significantly, the court
noted that reassignment must be “reasonable.”77 However, the court did not
provide a clear definition of “reasonable.”78 This limitation on the “[s]cope
of the reassignment duty” was listed separately from the list of “[s]pecific
[l]imitations on an [e]mployer’s [d]uty to [r]eassign” that followed in the
opinion and included the undue hardship defense.79 Apparently, “reasonableness” was a factor to be considered in addition to other specific limitations
and the undue hardship defense; reassignment was not presumed to be reasonable simply because it was included as a possible accommodation in the
ADA or because it “passed” the other specific limitations listed.
Next, the court listed eight “specific” limitations—“broadly accepted limitations on an employer’s duty to reassign that have evolved under ADA case
law in our circuit and others”80—with support from the ADA, the EEOC
guidelines, further EEOC guidance, caselaw from other circuits, and legislative history.81
1. The employer and employee must generally engage in “good-faith
communications” through an interactive process that usually must be
initiated by the employee and during which the employee must—if
she is seeking or open to reassignment—express her desire to be reassigned if no accommodation for the employee’s current position is
possible.82
2. The court stated: “Reassignment is limited to existing jobs within the
company. It is not reasonable to require an employer to create a new
job for the purpose of reassigning an employee to that job.”83
3. It also held that while a “vacant” position includes not only currently
vacant positions but also “positions that the employer reasonably
anticipates will become vacant in the fairly immediate future,”84 the
reassignment position under consideration must actually be vacant.85
The court further explained that a collective bargaining agreement
may trump the ADA reassignment accommodation requirement.86
4. The court noted that some other employment policies—such as a
“well entrenched seniority system”—might trump ADA reassignment
76 Id. at 1170–71.
77 Id. at 1171.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1170–74.
80 Id. at 1171 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 1171–78.
82 Id. at 1171–73.
83 Id. at 1174 (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 1175.
85 Id. at 1175.
86 Id. at 1175 (“Similarly, an existing position would not truly be vacant, even though it
is not presently filled by an existing employee, if under a collective bargaining agreement
other employees have a vested priority right to such vacant positions.”).
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where the policies “may be so fundamental to the way an employer
does business that it would be unreasonable to set aside.”87
5. The court stated that “[r]eassignment does not require promotion,”
but that the employer should “consider lateral moves” before considering demotions.88
6. The employee is also not guaranteed the reassignment position which
he or she prefers; rather, “[s]o long as it is consistent with the above
requirements, the employer is free to choose the reassignment that is
to be offered.”89
7. An “[e]mployer need offer only a reassignment as to which the
employee is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation,”90
and
8. “[N]o reassignment need be offered if it would create an ‘undue
hardship’ on the employer.”91
The Tenth Circuit made reassignment, not consideration of reassignment,
a mandatory accommodation, but with specific categorical limitations,
including an unclearly defined “reasonableness” requirement.
C.

EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.92

After Nancy House Cooker developed tennis elbow from a work accident, she was unable to perform her duties as a warehouse picker.93
Houser’s employer first tried to accommodate Houser in her warehouse position by “rigg[ing] an apron” to enable Houser to continue “to carry pharmaceutical products from a shelf to a conveyor belt.”94 Houser applied for
“several vacant clerical positions . . . but in each case was turned down in
favor of another applicant, and as a result was eventually let go by the
company.”95
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held “that the ADA does not require an
employer to reassign a disabled employee to a job for which there is a better
applicant, provided it’s the employer’s consistent and honest policy to hire
the best applicant for the particular job in question rather than the first qualified applicant.”96 In short, a most-qualified-candidate hiring policy can
trump the ADA reassignment requirement. The court rejected what it perceived to be the EEOC’s argument—that the ADA “require[s] that the dis87 Id. at 1175–76.
88 Id. at 1176–77.
89 Id. at 1177.
90 Id. at 1178.
91 Id.
92 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
2012).
93 Id. at 1026.
94 Id. at 1026.
95 Id. at 1026–27.
96 Id. at 1029.
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abled person be advanced over a more qualified nondisabled person,
provided only that the disabled person is at least minimally qualified to do
the job, unless the employer can show ‘undue hardship,’ a safe harbor under
the statute”97—because such an “interpretation requires employers to give
bonus points to people with disabilities, much as veterans’ preference statutes do”98 and may force the employer to “pass over the superior applicant
who . . . might himself or herself be disabled or belong to some other protected class.”99
The court also rejected what it perceived to be the EEOC’s argument
that if an employee is merely able to compete, there is nothing “left of the
duty to reassign a disabled worker to a vacant position.”100 The court then
distinguished Aka because that case did not involve a superior applicant without a disability or an employer with a “consistent policy of preferring the best
candidate for a vacancy rather than merely hiring the first qualified person to
apply.”101 It also rejected the Tenth Circuit cases, including Midland Brake,
stating that “[a] policy of giving the job to the best applicant is legitimate and
nondiscriminatory. Decisions on the merits are not discriminatory.”102
While the court acknowledged “that antidiscrimination statutes impose
costs on employers,” it explained that there is a “principled” difference
between requiring employers to clear away obstacles to hiring the best applicant for a job . . . and requiring employers to hire inferior (albeit minimally
qualified) applicants merely because they are members of . . . a [“protected”] group. That is affirmative action with a vengeance. . . . It goes well
beyond enabling the disabled applicant to compete in the workplace . . . .103

The Seventh Circuit rejected the suggestion that the ADA reassignment
requirement should trump an established policy of hiring the most qualified
candidate.
D.

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett104

After Robert Barnett hurt his back as a cargo handler for US Airways,
“[h]e invoked seniority rights and transferred to a less physically demanding
mailroom position,” which was periodically opened to a seniority-based bidding process.105 Barnett requested, but was denied, a reassignment accommodation under the ADA—to allow him to keep the position to which he
had been transferred rather than allowing other employees to bid for the
97 Id. at 1027 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012)).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1028.
100 Id. at 1027–28.
101 Id. at 1028.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1028–29 (emphasis added).
104 535 U.S. 391 (2002); see Porter, supra note 5, at 538–41 (discussing Barnett).
105 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
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position according to the seniority system.106 The Supreme Court considered the following question:
[In the case of] conflict between: (1) the interests of a disabled worker who
seeks assignment to a particular position as a “reasonable accommodation,”
and (2) the interests of other workers with superior rights to bid for the job
under an employer’s seniority system. . . . [D]oes the accommodation
demand trump the seniority system?107

The Court ultimately concluded that “the seniority system will prevail in the
run of cases.”108
First, the Court addressed each of the parties’ interpretations of the
ADA reassignment requirement. According to the Court, US Airways
“claim[ed] that a seniority system virtually always trumps a conflicting accommodation”; that the conflicting accommodation is necessarily “unreasonable”; and that these contentions are primarily based on the idea that the ADA
“seeks only ‘equal’ treatment for those with disabilities. It does not . . .
require an employer to grant preferential treatment.”109 The Court explicitly
rejected US Airways’ preferential treatment argument, stating “that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal”; accommodations require that individuals with disabilities be
treated differently, even if that different treatment may “violate[ ] an
employer’s disability-neutral rule,”110 such as “[n]eutral furniture budget
rules [that] would [otherwise] automatically prevent the accommodation of
an individual who needs a different kind of chair or desk.”111
Before addressing Barnett’s interpretation, the Court noted that the
position which Barnett desired was vacant; the seniority system merely gave
employees the right “to bid for . . . ‘vacant’ position[s].”112 The Court
rejected Barnett’s interpretations. The Court explained that “reasonable”
does not mean “effective” in “ordinary English,”113 and Congress has never
equated the two terms; the EEOC and lower courts also have never interpreted “enable” to “mean the same thing” as “reasonable.”114 Next, the
Court explained why “ ‘reasonable accommodation’ ” is not “a simple, redundant mirror image of the term ‘undue hardship’ ”—“undue hardship” refers
to impacts “on the operation of the business,”115 while an accommodation
may be “unreasonable” due to “its impact . . . on fellow employees.”116
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
omitted).
116 Id.

at 393–94.
at 394.
at 397 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
(emphasis added).
at 398.
at 399.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted).
at 400 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A) (1994)) (internal quotation marks
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Finally, the Court explained how the lower courts had reconciled the phrases
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” so that they did not create a “burden of proof dilemma”:117
They have held that a plaintiff/employee (to defeat a defendant/
employer’s motion for summary judgment) need only show that an “accommodation” seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.
Once the plaintiff has made this showing, the defendant/employer
then must show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.118

The Court next applied the lower courts’ test to this particular case, first
asking whether a request for assignment to the mailroom position is reasonable “ordinarily or in the run of cases” where such an assignment “would violate the rules of a seniority system.”119 The Court concluded that “it would
not be reasonable in the run of cases that the assignment in question trump
the rules of a seniority system.”120 In support of this holding, the Court cited
“[a]nalogous case law,” including a Title VII religious discrimination case
and Rehabilitation Act cases.121 The Court admitted that “[a]ll these cases
discuss collectively bargained seniority systems, not systems (like the present system) which are unilaterally imposed by management.”122 However, the
Court explained that “the relevant seniority system advantages, and related
difficulties that result from violations of seniority rules, are not limited to
collectively bargained systems.”123 Notably, “the typical seniority system provides important employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling, employee
expectations of fair, uniform treatment”;124 “a complex case-specific ‘accommodation’ decision made by management [should not undermine] the more
uniform, impersonal operation of seniority rules.”125
However, the Court did explain that “[t]he plaintiff (here the
employee) nonetheless remains free to show that special circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a seniority system (which the ADA
may not trump in the run of cases), the requested ‘accommodation’ is ‘reasonable’ on the particular facts.”126 The Court provided examples, such as
when an employer “fairly frequently” allows exceptions to the seniority system.127 In short, the Supreme Court molded a “reasonableness” requirement which the plaintiff must meet before the court will consider the
separate undue hardship analysis. To meet the reasonableness requirement,
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
including
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.

at 401–02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
(citations omitted).
at 402–03.
at 403.
(also citing cases which discuss collective bargaining agreements and the ADA,
Midland Brake).
at 404.

at 394.
at 405.
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the plaintiff must show more than that the accommodation listed in the ADA
would be “effective”; the plaintiff either must show that an accommodation is
reasonable in the “run of cases” or—if such ordinary reasonableness cannot
be shown—is reasonable in this particular case.
E.

Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.128

After Pam Huber injured her arm and hand, she was no longer able to
fulfill her job duties as a grocery order filler.129 Rather than automatically
reassigning Huber to a vacant and equivalent position as a router, Huber’s
employer required her to “apply and compete” for the position, which was
ultimately filled by an individual who did not have a disability because he or
she was the most qualified candidate for the position.130 Huber took a
janitorial position at another Walmart facility, making around half her previous salary.131
The court held that:
We agree [with the Seventh Circuit in Humiston-Keeling] and conclude
the ADA is not an affirmative action statute and does not require an
employer [as a reasonable accommodation] to reassign a qualified disabled
employee to a vacant position when such a reassignment would violate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most qualified candidate.132

As this was a “question of first impression” for the Eight Circuit,133 it
relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Humiston-Keeling: “In the
Seventh Circuit, ADA reassignment does not require an employer to reassign
a qualified disabled employee to a job for which there is a more qualified
applicant, if the employer has a policy to hire the most qualified applicant.”134 In fact, the court explicitly adopted Walmart’s suggestion as being
“in accordance with the purposes of the ADA.”135
The Eighth Circuit intentionally aligned itself with the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Humiston-Keeling and against the Tenth Circuit in holding that
most-qualified-candidate policies may trump the ADA reassignment
requirement.

128 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007); see Cheryl L. Anderson, Unification of Standards in
Discrimination Law: The Conundrum of Causation and Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA,
82 MISS. L.J. 67, 121 n.279 (2013) (discussing Huber and Barnett).
129 Huber, 486 F.3d at 481.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 483 (footnote omitted).
133 Id. at 482.
134 Id. at 483.
135 Id.
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Mays v. Principi136

This suit involved a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.137 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that “[t]here [were] no reasonable accommodation[s] that would have enabled the plaintiff to return to her old job as a
regular staff nurse,”138 and that the ADA does not require that two jobs be
created—one for the plaintiff and one for someone to help the plaintiff fulfill the requirements of the plaintiff’s new position.139 The court concluded
that “assuming that she was qualified for such a job, if nevertheless there
were better-qualified applicants—and the evidence is uncontradicted that
there were—the VA did not violate its duty of reasonable accommodation by
giving the job to them instead of to her.”140 The court finally concluded that
“the VA did accommodate the plaintiff’s disability, and the accommodation
was reasonable,”141 even if not ideal for the plaintiff.
G.

EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc.142

The EEOC challenged United Airlines’ Reasonable Accommodation
Guidelines—under which an employee who was no longer able to perform
the essential functions of her job due to a disability would not be automatically assigned to a vacant position, but rather allowed to compete for the
position with some preferential treatment143—as a violation of the ADA.
In this case, the Seventh Circuit thought it “likely” that the EEOC’s interpretation in Humiston-Keeling “may in fact be a more supportable interpretation of the ADA.”144 However, for the EEOC to “force an abandonment of
stare decisis,” it would have to “show that Humiston-Keeling is inconsistent with
an on-point Supreme Court decision or is otherwise incompatible with a
change in statutory law.”145 Ultimately, the court held it was consistent.146
In short, the Seventh Circuit felt compelled by its own post-Barnett decisions—which relied on the pre-Barnett decision in Humiston-Keeling—to reject
the EEOC’s contention that an individual with a disability should be reassigned if he or she is “ ‘at least minimally qualified to do the job,’ ”147 even if
that view was more in line with the ADA than was the Humiston-Keeling holding that a most-qualified-applicant policy may trump the ADA reassignment
provision.
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
1024,

301 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 868.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id. at 872.
Id.
673 F.3d 543 (7th Cir.), vacated, United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 543–44.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 544 (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d
1027 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760).
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United Airlines II148

On September 7, 2012, the same Seventh Circuit panel (Judges Cudahy,
Kanne, and Sykes) vacated its March decision, issued a new opinion without a
formal en banc procedure, and “circulated the new panel opinion to the full
court under Rule 40(e).”149 Tracing its original opinion nearly identically,
the panel came to the opposite conclusion.150
Rather than accepting its own precedent in Humiston-Keeling and postBarnett decisions that relied on Humiston-Keeling, the court held that
“[s]everal courts in this circuit have relied on Humiston-Keeling in post-Barnett
opinions, though it appears that these courts did not conduct a detailed analysis of Humiston-Keeling’s continued vitality. The present case offers us the
opportunity to correct this continuing error in our jurisprudence.”151
The court copied nearly identically its explanation of the history of the
case, the court’s review standard, its explanation of the EEOC’s and the Seventh Circuit’s postures in Humiston-Keeling, and its explanation of the facts of
the Barnett case.152 However, the analysis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Barnett differed between United Airlines I and United Airlines II153—United
Airlines II emphasized the two-step nature of the analysis, the plaintiff’s
requirement merely to “show that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on
its face,” and the subsequent burden shift to the defendant.154 United Airlines
II also clarified that the Barnett decision was made in favor of the defendant
because “the violation of a seniority system ‘would not [have been] reasonable in the run of cases,’ ” not because the defendant had presented an undue
hardship as United Airlines I had claimed.155 United Airlines II further
clarified:
However, the Court was careful to point out that it was not creating a per se
exception for seniority systems, since “[t]he plaintiff . . . nonetheless remains
free to show that special circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the
presence of a seniority system (which the ADA may not trump in the run of
148 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).
149 Id. at 761.
150 Id.
151 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 761.
152 Compare id. at 761–62, with United Airlines I, 673 F.3d at 544–45.
153 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 762–63; United Airlines I, 673 F.3d at 545. However, the
first part of the paragraphs did begin with identical language. See, e.g., United Airlines II,
693 F.3d at 762 (“The Supreme Court first noted that ‘[t]he simple fact that an accommodation would provide a ‘preference’—in the sense that it would permit the worker with a
disability to violate a rule that others must obey—cannot, in and of itself, automatically show
that the accommodation is not ‘reasonable.’” (quoting US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535
U.S. 391, 398 (2002))).
154 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 762 (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Compare United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 762–63, with United Airlines I,
673 F.3d at 545.
155 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763 (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403).
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cases), the requested ‘accommodation’ is ‘reasonable’ on the particular
facts.”156

The court again acknowledged the EEOC’s argument that “the Barnett
Court flatly contradicted much of the language of Humiston-Keeling” in language nearly identical to the language it had used in United Airlines I.157 It
also again noted that Mays “complicated” the “analysis of Barnett’s impact on
Humiston-Keeling.”158 However, the outcome of United Airlines II is markedly
different from that of United Airlines I.
First, rather than acknowledging but ultimately rejecting the EEOC’s
contention that it was wrong for the Mays court to equate a best-qualified
selection policy with a seniority system,159 United Airlines II explicitly adopted
the EEOC’s argument and added to its reasoning:
The EEOC argues, and we agree, that the Mays Court incorrectly
asserted that a best-qualified selection policy is essentially the same as a
seniority system. In equating the two, the Mays Court so enlarged the narrow, fact-specific exception set out in Barnett as to swallow the rule. While
employers may prefer to hire the best qualified applicant, the violation of a best-qualified selection policy does not involve the property-rights and administrative concerns
(and resulting burdens) presented by the violation of a seniority policy. To
strengthen this critique, the EEOC points out the relative rarity of seniority
systems and the distinct challenges of mandating reassignment in a system
where employees are already entitled to particular positions based on years
of employment.160

Second, rather than acknowledging but rejecting the positions of the
Tenth and D.C. Circuits in Midland Brake and Aka, respectively, the court
decided to “adopt a similar approach” to those two courts.161
Third, the court made no attempt to address the two other post-Barnett
Seventh Circuit opinions which had relied on Humiston-Keeling as good law
beyond the assertion that “[s]everal courts in this circuit have relied on
Humiston-Keeling in post-Barnett opinions, though it appears that these courts
did not conduct a detailed analysis of Humiston-Keeling’s continued vitality.”162 Finally, the court rejected United Airlines’ argument that the court
“should not abandon Humiston-Keeling, in part because the Eighth Circuit
explicitly adopted the reasoning of Humiston-Keeling in [Huber],” acknowledging that “[t]he Eighth Circuit’s wholesale adoption of Humiston-Keeling” in
Huber “ha[d] little import” where “[t]he opinion adopt[ed] Humiston-Keeling
without analysis, much less an analysis of Humiston-Keeling in the context of
156
157
158
United
159
160
161
162

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405).
Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted); compare United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763–64, with
Airlines I, 673 F.3d at 545.
United Airlines I, 673 F.3d at 546.
United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 764 (emphasis added).
Id. at 765.
Id. at 761.
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Barnett.”163 Rejecting its post-Barnett precedents, the Seventh Circuit held
that Humiston-Keeling—and its holding that a best-qualified-candidate selection policy could trump the ADA reassignment provision—had not survived
Barnett.164
III.
A.

ANALYSIS
Background

In evaluating the benefits of United Airlines II to the plaintiff’s toolbox, it
is most useful to imagine a spectrum of employment policies regarding reassignment, ranging from those which almost certainly cannot trump ADA
reassignment to those which make reassignment unreasonable “in the run of
cases.”

Midland Brake and EEOC enforcement guidance make it clear that the
ADA reassignment provision certainly trumps any employment policies generally prohibiting transfers within the company, unless, of course, the
employer could show undue hardship.165
163 Id. at 764 (footnote omitted) (citing Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480,
483–84 (8th Cir. 2007)). United Airlines I would have been willing to “lessen[ ] this [circuit] split” between the Tenth and D.C. Circuits on the one hand and the Eighth Circuit
on the other by siding with the Tenth and D.C. Circuits “if, in fact, Barnett undermine[d]
Humiston-Keeling.” United Airlines I, 673 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated, United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760.
164 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 761.
165 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE
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Though the Aka court was presented with a collective bargaining agreement including a provision for employees with disabilities,166 it explicitly
refused to address what would happen if a collective bargaining agreement
conflicted with the ADA.167 Meanwhile, Midland Brake held that “an existing
position would not truly be vacant [and therefore not available for ADA reassignment], even though it is not presently filled by an existing employee, if
under a collective bargaining agreement other employees have a vested priority right to such vacant positions.”168 Both opinions were written before
Barnett.169
Meanwhile, Midland Brake stated in dicta and Barnett held that seniority
systems can most likely trump ADA reassignment where the seniority systems
are consistently applied.170 The real danger of Barnett is that it generalizes
the seniority system exception—that it is ordinarily unreasonable for an ADA
reassignment provision to trump a seniority system—into a rebuttable presumption test, applicable to all considerations of whether a reassignment is
reasonable. This potentially opens the door for other exceptions to the reassignment requirement. For example, while Midland Brake categorically
rejected that best-qualified policies can be used to prevent ADA reassignment,171 Barnett left open the question of whether a best-qualified policy
could make reassignment ordinarily unreasonable under its new rebuttable
presumption test.172
In addition, Barnett heightened the burden on plaintiffs to prove reasonableness.173 Barnett tried to argue that a “reasonableness” evaluation merely
HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 41 (1999)); Enforcement Guidance:
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S.
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html
(last modified Oct. 22, 2002).
166 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
167 Id. at 1301.
168 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1175.
169 Id. at 1154; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1284.
170 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402–06 (2002); Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at
1175–76.
171 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164–70. The court in Aka also declared that reassignment must mean more than consideration. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304.
172 Barnett also does not address collective bargaining agreements generally—that is,
those that do not relate to or provide for seniority systems. See Anderson, supra note 128,
at 121 n.279; Conway, supra note 35, at 724.
173 One scholarly article from 2003—just after Barnett but long before United Airlines
II—suggested that Barnett had a narrow holding which left many ambiguities for future
application, especially regarding which issues should be determined at the reasonableness
stage and undue hardship phase, and which party should be responsible for particular
showings at each stage. Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 960–67, 980–85 (2003). Another scholar has read
Barnett even more broadly: “Barnett requires the ADA’s accommodation requirement to
yield to all workplace policies that constrain employer discretion, at least in most
instances.” Matthew A. Shapiro, Labor Goals and Antidiscrimination Norms: Employer Discre-
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requires a determination of whether the accommodation is effective for the
person with a disability, and that any other interpretation would simply make
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” mirror images of one
another—creating a problem of proof where the plaintiff must prove “reasonableness” and the employer must show “undue hardship.”174 However,
Barnett rejected all of these interpretations and specifically indicated that
while the ADA “refer[red] to an ‘undue hardship on the operation of the
business,’ ” “a demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow
employees.”175 The Court adopted the approach that the lower courts had
developed to give both “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship”
meaning, while avoiding the burden of proof dilemma: a plaintiff must show
an accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the
run of cases” and, if achieved, the defendant “must show special (typically
case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”176 In other words, while plaintiffs had argued that they
should not have to show anything more than that an accommodation would
have been effective, the Court rejected that argument and held that the
plaintiff had to do more work by actually proving that something is reasonable.177 This is distinct from showing that something is an undue hardship.178
The Court did temper the burden on plaintiffs slightly in its application
of the lower courts’ approach to the case at hand. The Court added that if
the plaintiff could not show that an accommodation was “reasonable on its
face” or “ordinarily or in the run of cases,” she could still try to show reasonableness in the particular circumstances of the case,179 and even provided
some examples of how the plaintiff might do so in the context of a seniority
system.180 The Court also rejected US Airways’ argument that the ADA does
not require preferential treatment181 and provided other language that
proved to be useful to the Seventh Circuit in further tempering Barnett’s
heightened burden on plaintiffs with a relatively plaintiff-friendly
approach.182
The meaning of “reasonable” was unclear before Barnett and remains
unclear after Barnett, as evidenced in law review articles and by many differing circuit court interpretations on the subject both before and after Bartion, Reasonable Accommodation, and the Costs of Individualized Treatment, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 38 (2013).
174 See supra Section II.D.
175 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994)); see supra Section II.D.
176 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–02.
177 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–02; supra Section II.D.
178 See supra Section II.D.
179 Id. at 405.
180 Id.
181 See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
182 See infra subsections III.C.3–4.
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nett.183 However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United Airlines II and some
of the language that the Seventh Circuit adopted from Barnett and the EEOC
helped to (1) regain ground for plaintiffs after and under the Barnett
approach by establishing a plaintiff-friendly border on the reassignment spectrum; and (2) provide plaintiffs with tools to argue that other employment
policies should fall toward the left side of the spectrum—that is, that other
policies should not render reassignment ordinarily unreasonable.184
B.

The Seventh Circuit’s Contribution to a Circuit Split185

United Airlines II is very significant in the jurisprudence of reassignment
as a reasonable accommodation. The Seventh Circuit has shifted what was
“at least” a two-to-one circuit split regarding whether a best-qualified policy
can trump the ADA, with Midland Brake on one side, Huber on the other, and
the Seventh Circuit now siding with Midland Brake.186 In a similar vein, Aka
held that “reassignment” meant more than simply “allow[ing] [an employee]
to compete for jobs precisely like any other applicant.”187 The United Airlines
II court explicitly joined the Tenth Circuit in Midland Brake and the D.C.
Circuit in Aka.188 It said that Humiston-Keeling, which held strictly that “the
‘ADA does not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a job
for which there is a better applicant, provided it’s the employer’s consistent
and honest policy to hire the best applicant for the particular job in question,’ ”189 did not survive past Barnett.190 However, the Eighth Circuit had
previously adopted the Seventh Circuit’s Humiston-Keeling decision in Huber
and continued to cite Huber, even after United Airlines II.191 Hence, it seems
183 See Porter, supra note 5, at 543–553, 544 n.93.
184 See infra subsections III.C.2–4.
185 One scholarly source summarizes the Seventh Circuit’s contribution to the circuit
split as follows: “The [Seventh Circuit] recently joined the 10th and D.C. circuits in
determining that an employer must, under most circumstances, reassign the disabled
employee to the vacant position in order to comply with the Americans with Disabilities
Act, even if she is not the most qualified candidate.” Wicks, supra note 11, at *1 (footnote
omitted).
186 See McGowan, supra note 12, at 869 (“The federal appeals courts currently are split
at least 2-1 on the issue, with the Seventh Circuit and the Tenth Circuit in [Midland Brake],
holding that the ADA requires an employer to grant the accommodation of reassignment
if the disabled employee meets the minimum qualifications for the vacant job. The Eighth
Circuit in Huber reached the opposite conclusion, ruling the ADA does not require an
employer to grant a disabled employee’s request for reassignment if there is a better qualified candidate for the vacancy.” (citation omitted)).
187 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
188 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2012).
189 Id. at 762 (quoting EEOC v. Humiston–Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir.
2000), overruled by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760).
190 Id. at 761.
191 Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 2013). A Third
Circuit case also seemed to be incorrect in citing a pre-Barnett Second Circuit opinion in a
string cite: “see also Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir. 1993) (‘[A]
reasonable accommodation generally does not require an employer to reassign a disabled
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that the circuit split may not be completely resolved, but evaluating any circuit split, potential resolution of any circuit split, and the impact of United
Airlines II on any circuit split is unfortunately beyond the scope of this
Note.192
The Seventh Circuit did not overrule Humiston-Keeling by explicitly stating that ADA reassignment will always trump a best-qualified selection policy.
Instead, it adopted the two-step Barnett approach.193 It also stated that “[t]he
Mays Court understandably erred in suggesting that deviation from a bestqualified selection policy always represented [an undue] hardship” and that
“the Barnett framework does not contain categorical exceptions.”194 The Seventh Circuit clarified that US Airways in Barnett had won not because its
“ ‘neutral rule’ ” was an “ ‘automatic exemption’ ”195 to the reassignment
requirement of the ADA but “because its situation satisfied a much narrower,
fact-specific exception based on the hardship that could be imposed on an
employer utilizing a seniority system.”196 In short, Humiston-Keeling was
incorrect in the sense that it held categorically that a best-qualified selection
policy would trump the ADA. The Seventh Circuit bolstered the rejection
that it did make of Humiston-Keeling by explaining that Barnett had rejected
Humiston-Keeling’s anti-preference interpretation of the ADA—“that the ADA
is ‘not a mandatory preference act’ but only a ‘nondiscrimination statute’ ”197—by stating that “this argument ‘fails to recognize what the Act specifies, namely, that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the
Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.’ ”198 Even if the circuit split has not been
resolved, United Airlines II has certainly contributed to conversations regarding best-qualified selection policies and the proper application of Barnett
more generally.199

employee to a different position.’).” Yovtcheva v. City of Phila. Water Dep’t, 518 F. App’x
116, 122 (3d Cir. 2013).
192 One student note denied that United Airlines II “constitute[d] the brazen shift in
policy attributed to it by scholars. Instead, this Comment contends that, in light of Barnett,
the Seventh Circuit has identified a middle ground that attempts to reconcile it with Barnett, while sill remaining loyal to the ADA’s text, legislative history, and purpose.” Concannon, supra note 12, at 634–35.
193 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 762–64.
194 Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
195 Id. at 763 (quoting US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 398 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
196 Id. (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405).
197 Id. (quoting EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000),
overruled by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760).
198 Id. (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397).
199 There is significant conversation regarding Barnett and United Airlines II. See
McGowan, supra note 12, at 868.
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The Seventh Circuit’s Contribution to the Plaintiff’s Toolbox

The Seventh Circuit Likely Did Make Mandatory Reassignment
Ordinarily Reasonable200

The Seventh Circuit adopted the Barnett analysis but is admittedly
unclear as to which circumstances should fall under the “reasonableness”
analysis, and which should fall under “undue hardship” analysis. That is, if
the consideration of the seniority system came in during the “reasonableness” analysis,201 the plaintiff would have had to show that reassignment in
light of an employer’s seniority system was reasonable.202 However, the United
Airlines II court stated: “The Supreme Court has found that accommodation
through appointment to a vacant position is reasonable. Absent a showing of
undue hardship, an employer must implement such a reassignment policy.”203 The court did not clearly state in that language that the first step
“reasonableness” determination could be affected by other circumstances,
but rather appeared to leave the work for the second step.204 Further, the
court stated that “[t]he Mays Court understandably erred in suggesting that
deviation from a best-qualified selection policy always represented such a[n]
[undue] hardship.”205 The Mays court equated a better-qualified selection
policy with a seniority system for purposes of Barnett by substituting “better
qualified” for “more senior,” “the employer’s normal method of filling vacancies” for “ ‘seniority system,” and “a break’ ” for “superseniority” in the following sentence206: “This conclusion is bolstered by a recent decision of the
Supreme Court which holds that an employer is not required to give a disabled employee superseniority to enable him to retain his job when a more
senior employee invokes an entitlement to it conferred by the employer’s
seniority system.”207 The Mays court itself did not say that the best-qualified
selection policy came in during the “undue hardship” analysis;208 it did not
even use the term “undue hardship.” If Mays was simply read as inserting a
best-qualified selection policy into the Barnett analysis, as in the above quotation, it would have been considered at the first reasonableness stage, as was
the seniority system in Barnett, not at the undue hardship second stage, as
United Airlines II seems to assert.209
200 At least some scholarly sources seem to assume that this is the case. See Wicks, supra
note 11, at *2.
201 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403–05.
202 See id.
203 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 764.
204 See id.
205 Id.
206 Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760.
207 Id. (citing US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393–95, 403–07 (2002)).
208 See id.
209 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402–03; United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 764 (providing no citation
for the statement that “[t]he Mays Court understandably erred in suggesting that deviation
from a best-qualified selection policy always represented such a hardship”). Scholarly
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However, United Airlines II explicitly aligned itself with the Tenth Circuit
in Midland Brake and the D.C. Circuit in Aka, as discussed in Section III.B of
this analysis.210 Midland Brake, Humiston-Keeling, and Mays all spoke in “best”
and/or “qualified” terms.211 Meanwhile, Aka spoke in terms of “compet[ing] for jobs” versus being “appointed to a new position” when questioning the meaning of reassignment in a reasonable accommodation claim.212
Both languages seem to address the same issue: if a best-qualified selection
policy could trump ADA reassignment, that would mean that the employee
with a disability would only be able to compete in order to show that he is the
most qualified candidate—that is, “compete” for a position rather than be
mandatorily reassigned if he is “otherwise qualified.”
The United Airlines II opinion could also be interpreted as taking the
position that “reassignment” means “mandatory appointment” to a new position. First, the court said that “[t]he Supreme Court has found that accommodation through appointment to a vacant position is reasonable. Absent a
showing of undue hardship, an employer must implement such a reassignment
policy.”213 Even more explicitly, the court speaks of “mandatory reassignment” in its directions on remand214:
In this case, the district court must first consider (under Barnett step one) if
mandatory reassignment is ordinarily, in the run of cases, a reasonable accommodation. Assuming that the district court finds that mandatory reassignment
is ordinarily reasonable, the district must then determine (under Barnett step
two) if there are fact-specific considerations particular to United’s employment system that would create an undue hardship and render mandatory
reassignment unreasonable.215

In the footnote after the first sentence of the remand directions, the
court stated that the first step should not be difficult because “mandatory
pieces similarly confuse and conflate the reasonableness and undue hardship steps of the
analysis as well. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 35, at 734 (“The Court reiterated its determination that the existence of a non-discriminatory policy is not dispositive by allowing the
employee to show that reassignment does not impose an undue hardship on the employer
because the non-discriminatory policy is not routinely enforced or contains so many exceptions that it does not create an enforceable expectation by other employees.” (footnote
omitted)); see also Stephen Gee, Note, The “Moral Hazards” of Title VII’s Religious Accommodation Doctrine, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1131, 1143 (2014) (“Judge Cudahy found that Barnett
created a two-step process in evaluating whether an accommodation would not impose
undue hardship by violating an otherwise strictly enforced neutral rule or law of general
applicability. Judge Cudahy remanded the case to determine whether a mandated reassignment passes the Barnett two-step analysis.” (footnotes omitted)).
210 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 765.
211 Mays, 301 F.3d at 872 (examples include “better qualified” and “not as well qualified”); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027–29 (7th Cir. 2000) (examples
include “best applicant” and “best candidate”), overruled by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760;
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1168–70 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
212 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
213 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 764 (emphasis added).
214 Id.
215 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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reassignment” was “the very accommodation analyzed in Barnett.”216 It is in
this sense that United Airlines II joins the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit,
which “ha[d] already determined that the ADA requires employers to
appoint disabled employees to vacant positions, provided that such accommodations would not create an undue hardship (or run afoul of a collective
bargaining agreement).”217
United Airlines II’s directions for remand explicitly indicate that the lower
court should consider whether “mandatory reassignment” is ordinarily reasonable, not whether mandatory reassignment in light of other relevant circumstances—such as a policy that requires individuals with disabilities to
compete for vacant positions but provides those individuals with ‘preferential
treatment’ in that process (as was the case in the United Airlines Reasonable
Accommodation Guidelines218)—is ordinarily reasonable. However, the
footnote after the first sentence of the directions does seem to contemplate
that other circumstances could potentially be considered at this stage. The
court explained that where “mandatory reassignment” was the accommodation analyzed in Barnett, “the Supreme Court ‘assume[d] that normally such
a request would be reasonable within the meaning of the statute, were it not
for one circumstance, namely, that the assignment would violate the rules of
a seniority system.’ ”219 The court when on to explain that “[t]here is no
seniority system at issue here. However, we suppose it is possible there is
some comparable circumstance of which we are unaware.”220 The Seventh
Circuit also stated in the main text of its opinion that “[a]n ‘employer’s showing of violation of the rules of a seniority system is by itself ordinarily sufficient’ to demonstrate that the accommodation sought is unreasonable.”221
The court seems to acknowledge that Barnett did more in the first step than
consider whether mandatory reassignment alone was reasonable.222 United
Airlines II’s conclusion does little to clarify exactly what must be considered at
each stage of analysis. Even if United Airlines II has adopted the Barnett analysis so that the plaintiff does possess a real burden of showing reasonableness
on the first step, however, the Seventh Circuit still makes the language of that
first step more plaintiff-friendly.
2.

United Airlines II Likely Set a Plaintiff-Friendly Border on the
Reassignment Spectrum Under the Barnett Analysis

The Seventh Circuit used Barnett to reject its own employer-friendly precedent. The court explicitly overturned Humiston-Keeling: “[W]e now make
216 Id. at 764 n.3.
217 Id. at 764–65.
218 Id. at 761.
219 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting US Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S.
391, 403 (2002)).
220 Id. at 761 n.3.
221 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763 (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402–03).
222 See id.
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clear that Humiston-Keeling did not survive Barnett.”223 It also seems to have
implicitly overruled Craig v. Potter224 and King v. City of Madison.225 Though
United Airlines II did not mention these cases explicitly, as had United Airlines
I,226 United Airlines II did acknowledge that “[s]everal courts in this circuit
ha[d] relied on Humiston-Keeling in post-Barnett opinions.”227 However, the
court also noted that “it appears that these courts did not conduct a detailed
analysis of Humiston-Keeling’s continued vitality.”228 Then, it clearly stated,
“[t]he present case offers us the opportunity to correct this continuing error
in our jurisprudence.”229 The court specifically chose to quote plaintifffriendly language from Barnett: “The Supreme Court first noted that ‘[t]he
simple fact that an accommodation would provide a ‘preference’—in the
sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule that
others must obey—cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not ‘reasonable.’’ ”230 The court also cited other language from
Barnett that contradicted Humiston-Keeling’s claim “that the ADA is ‘not a
mandatory preference act.’ ”231
Abrogating a Seventh Circuit case which had tried to apply Barnett,232
United Airlines II adopted and added to the plaintiff’s argument “that the
Mays Court incorrectly asserted that a best-qualified selection policy is essentially the same as a seniority system.”233 The court adopted the following
wording that had been attributed to the EEOC in United Airlines I: “In equating the [best-qualified selection policy and the seniority system], the Mays
Court so enlarged the narrow, fact-specific exception set out in Barnett as to
swallow the rule.”234 The “rule” to which the court is likely referring is likely
that stated in the prior section of this analysis—that mandatory reassignment
is ordinarily reasonable. Whether considering other employment policies
during the reasonableness or undue hardship phase, allowing a best-qualified
policy to make mandatory reassignment unreasonable would essentially
negate the idea that reassignment is mandatory. That is, if a best-qualified
selection policy may trump the ADA requirement for accommodation
223 Id. at 761.
224 90 F. App’x 160 (7th Cir. 2004).
225 550 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2008).
226 United Airlines I, 673 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated, United Airlines II, 693
F.3d 760.
227 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 761.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 762 (alterations in original) (quoting US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,
398 (2002)).
230 Id. at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted).
231 Id. at 763 (quoting EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir.
2000), overruled by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760).
232 Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2002), abrogated by United Airlines II, 693 F.3d
760.
233 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 764.
234 Id.; see United Airlines I, 673 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated, United Airlines II,
693 F.3d 760.
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through reassignment, then reassignment is no longer mandatory; the
employee may compete for a position but is not automatically reassigned.235
Further, for United Airlines II to hold that equating a best-qualified policy to a
seniority system would “swallow the rule,”236 the rule to which the court
refers must be more than simply being considered for reassignment, because
a best-qualified selection policy would be equivalent to such consideration
and would have already “swallow[ed] the rule.”237
United Airlines II also acknowledged the EEOC’s further support for its
rejection of the Mays analysis: “the EEOC points out the relative rarity of
seniority systems and the distinct challenges of mandating reassignment in a
system where employees are already entitled to particular positions based on
years of employment.”238 The court also added its own support: “[w]hile
employers may prefer to hire the best qualified applicant, the violation of a
best-qualified selection policy does not involve the property-rights and
administrative concerns (and resulting burdens) presented by the violation
of a seniority policy.”239 By rejecting the idea that a best-qualified policy
could be treated as the seniority system had been treated in Barnett, the court
rejected the idea that a best-qualified policy could provide a rebuttable presumptive exception to the reassignment requirement, as the seniority system
had been treated in Barnett. Though remanding to the district court, the
court seems to be strongly suggesting that a best-qualified selection policy
likely cannot make reassignment unreasonable “in the run of cases.”240 Subsequent cases and scholarly articles have interpreted United Airlines II in such
a way.241
Midland Brake and Aka also stated—perhaps more clearly than United
Airlines II—that best-qualified policies cannot ordinarily trump the ADA.242
However, neither opinion considered best-qualified policies in terms of “reasonableness,” as apparently required under Barnett.243 Instead, both found
that the very meaning of “reassignment” in the ADA made it impossible for a
best-qualified policy to trump the ADA reassignment requirement.244 Midland Brake went on to explain that the reassignment requirement was cabined
in other ways, including reasonableness.245 Aka did not even seem to address
the meaning of “reasonableness” directly. Instead, the court simply rejected
235 See United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 764 (“In equating the two, the Mays Court so
enlarged the narrow, fact-specific exception set out in Barnett as to swallow the rule.”).
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 This phrase is quoted many times in United Airlines II. See, e.g., Wicks, supra note 11,
at *1, *2.
241 See, e.g., Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 7 F. Supp. 3d 526 (D. Md. 2014).
242 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164–70 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1303–06 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
243 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164–70; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1303–06.
244 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164–70; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1303–06.
245 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170–78.
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the dissent’s suggestion that Aka’s “only right was to be treated like any other
applicant for that position”246 and addressed the meaning of the term “reassignment,” itself. In fact, Midland Brake quoted Aka’s very language.247
Much more briefly than in Midland Brake, Aka did suggest some limitations
on the reassignment provision, but none of those limitations even directly
addressed the limitation of “reasonableness.”248 Further, Aka’s discussion of
whether ADA reassignment means more than being “treated like any other
applicant,” is all arguably dicta, as the question was not raised in the lower
court.249
Therefore, United Airlines II was not only meaningful because it contributed to a the circuit split discussion regarding whether individuals with disabilities should merely be considered for job positions under the reassignment
provision, but more importantly because it evaluated best-qualified policies
under the Barnett reasonableness analysis. If the “Reassignment Spectrum”
in Section III.A of this analysis were to be redrawn according to Barnett and
United Airlines II, Barnett had set the right end of the spectrum (“most likely
to trump ADA reassignment”) with “seniority systems,” and United Airlines II
had set the left border (“least likely to trump ADA reassignment”). That is,
while Barnett set only an employer-friendly precedent and border for the new
reassignment spectrum, United Airlines II seems to establish that there does
exist a plaintiff-friendly border for reasonableness of reassignment under the
Barnett approach at best-qualified policies.250 United Airlines II is using the
Barnett approach in a plaintiff-friendly way.
Neither Barnett nor United Airlines II specifically addressed employment
policies that explicitly prohibited transfers.251 Presumably, such policies
would remain to the left of best-qualified policies on the reassignment spectrum. The EEOC guidelines, which were updated after Barnett, continued to
assume that policies prohibiting transfers could not prohibit ADA reassignment.252 Logically, it seems that if employees with disabilities cannot be
made to prove that they are the best qualified applicant for a given position,
they also could not be explicitly prohibited from being transferred at all.
Neither Barnett nor United Airlines II clearly establishes whether collective bargaining agreements can render ADA reassignment ordinarily unrea246 Aka, 156 F.3d at 1303.
247 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304).
248 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305; see also Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164–70.
249 Aka, 156 F.3d at 1303–05.
250 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403–406 (2002); United Airlines II, 693
F.3d 760, 763–65 (7th Cir. 2012).
251 See Barnett, 535 U.S at 391; United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 760.
252 Enforcement Guidance, supra note 166 (“It is a reasonable accommodation to modify a
workplace policy when necessitated by an individual’s disability-related limitations, absent
undue hardship. But, reasonable accommodation only requires that the employer modify
the policy for an employee who requires such action because of a disability; therefore, the
employer may continue to apply the policy to all other employees.” (footnote omitted)).
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sonable, either.253 Nor do they address where other employment policies—
such as “up-and-out policies,” “job search leave policies,” “preferential treatment,” or “non-demotion policies”—would fit on the spectrum of reasonableness. However, United Airlines II provides language and cites that may be
useful for plaintiffs going forward to argue that such policies should not
render reassignment presumptively unreasonable under the Barnett reasonableness approach.
3.

United Airlines II May Provide Plaintiffs with Tools to Analogize
Employment Policies to Best-Qualified Policies Rather than
Seniority Systems254

Barnett created the employer-friendly border in the reasonableness analysis by holding that “it would not be reasonable in the run of cases that the
assignment in question trump the rules of a seniority system.”255 However,
the United Airlines II court noted that:
[T]he [Barnett] Court was careful to point out that it was not creating a per se
exception for seniority systems, since “[t]he plaintiff . . . nonetheless remains free
to show that special circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a seniority system (which the ADA may not trump in the run of
cases), the requested ‘accommodation’ is ‘reasonable’ on the particular
facts.”256

United Airlines II more clearly, and probably more accurately, explained
the Barnett decision as a “two-step” approach than had United Airlines I, where
the Seventh Circuit stated that “[w]hile Barnett’s request for assignment to
the mailroom was a ‘reasonable accommodation’ within the meaning of the
statute, the violation of a seniority system would present an undue hardship
to any employer.”257 By quoting the language from Barnett, the Seventh Circuit technically does nothing more than restate a step of Barnett. Barnett was
253 Barnett merely considered collective bargaining agreements in terms of “collectively
bargained seniority systems.” See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403–04. United Airlines II merely cited
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. in stating that “our sister Circuits have already determined that
the ADA requires employers to appoint disabled employees to vacant positions, provided
that such accommodations would not create an undue hardship (or run afoul of a collective bargaining agreement).” United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 765 (citing Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d
1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)). The EEOC guidelines also do not address collective
bargaining agreements. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 166.
254 Valerie Wicks states the following: “The crucial question that arises from the Barnett
line of cases is which employer policies will overcome the employer’s obligation to reassign
a disabled employee as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Put differently,
when will reassignment ‘seem[ ] reasonable on its face,’ and when will it not?” Wicks,
supra note 11, at *4 (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402).
255 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.
256 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citing
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405).
257 United Airlines I, 673 F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403),
vacated, United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760.
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clear and even provided examples to support that while a seniority system
might ordinarily trump ADA reassignment and render that reassignment
unreasonable, the plaintiff could provide evidence of special circumstances
to rebut that presumption.258 The Barnett Court also stated, in rejecting US
Airways’ contention “that a seniority system virtually always trumps a conflicting accommodation demand,”259 that “[i]n sum, the nature of the ‘reasonable accommodation’ requirement, the statutory examples, and the Act’s
silence about the exempting effect of neutral rules together convince us that
the Act does not create any such automatic exemption.”260 United Airlines II
chose to emphasize such aspect of the Barnett decision by clearly stating that
there was no “per se exception for seniority systems.”261
The court also used language that indicated that it considered the
seniority system to be a relatively unique exception to mandatory reassignment.262 The court was careful to state that the exception in Barnett for
seniority systems was “narrow[ ]” and “fact-specific.”263 The court also explicitly noted (from the EEOC) the “relative rarity”264 of seniority systems and
the “distinct challenges of mandating reassignment” where such systems are
in place,265 as well as “the property-rights and administrative concerns (and
resulting burdens) presented by the violation of a seniority policy.”266
The United Airlines II may have accepted, however, that collective bargaining agreements could or would trump ADA reassignment. The court
held that an undue hardship could “render mandatory reassignment unreasonable,”267 joining the Tenth and D.C. Circuits in this interpretation.268 In
Midland Brake, the Tenth Circuit had explicitly noted that “protecting rights
guaranteed under a collective bargaining agreement . . . would make it
unreasonable to require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a
particular job.”269 By including the parenthetical and the reference to the
Midland Brake opinion, the Seventh Circuit may be suggesting that collective
bargaining agreements should make reassignment ordinarily unreasonable.
While Midland Brake seemed to include both collective bargaining agreements and seniority systems as per se exceptions to the reasonableness of
ADA reassignment,270 it is not clear from a simple parenthetical and cite
reference whether the United Airlines II court considered collective bargaining agreements to be potential presumptions against reasonableness or
258 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405–06.
259 Id. at 397.
260 Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
261 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763.
262 See Conway, supra note 35, at 735–38.
263 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763.
264 Id. at 764.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 764–65.
269 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
270 Id.
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potential indicators of undue hardship. It is unlikely that the court was creating a per se exception. After all, the Seventh Circuit stated that “the Barnett
framework does not contain categorical exceptions,”271 even for seniority systems.272 United Airlines II may have been willing to give some consideration
to collective bargaining agreements as exceptions to ADA reassignment in
some sense.273 However, even if the Seventh Circuit was trying to suggest by
the parenthetical that it might consider the exceptional nature of collective
bargaining agreements, the suggestion could only be considered dicta.274
That is, future Seventh Circuit decisions which were confronted with a collective bargaining agreement would be free to reject the collective bargaining
agreement parenthetical in United Airlines II. Seventh Circuit plaintiffs could
certainly argue that collective bargaining agreements outside of collectively
bargained seniority systems are more like best-qualified policies than seniority systems in light of Barnett and United Airlines II.
Other than the exception of seniority systems and the potential exception of other collective bargaining agreement policies, the Seventh Circuit
did not specifically note any other circumstances that would certainly create a
presumption of unreasonableness.275 Therefore, plaintiffs can certainly
argue with the language of United Airlines II that other policies—such as “upand-out policies,” “job search leave policies,” or “non-demotion policies”—
should fall on the left side of the spectrum, as unlikely to trump ADA reassignment because they are more like best-qualified policies than “relative[ly]
rar[e]” seniority systems.276 United Airlines II chose to use the Barnett reasonableness analysis in a plaintiff-friendly way.
4.

The Language of United Airlines II May Prove Even More Beneficial to
Employee-Plaintiffs than the Language of Midland Brake

Barnett created uncertainty by rejecting a categorical approach to determine which employment policies can or cannot trump the ADA and
threatened the ground that plaintiffs had gained in the Tenth and D.C. Circuits regarding certain employment policies—such as best-qualified policies—under such a categorical approach. However, United Airlines II helped
plaintiffs to regain the ground of best-qualified policies under the Barnett
reasonableness approach—United Airlines II interpreted “reasonableness” in a
plaintiff-friendly way. In so doing, United Airlines II may have created a more
plaintiff-friendly approach after Barnett for addressing other types of employment policies than even Midland Brake had offered in its more categorical
approach.
271
272
273
274
275
276

United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 764.
Id. at 763.
See id. at 765.
See id.
See id. at 760.
See id. at 764.
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Most basically, Midland Brake fairly explicitly states that collective bargaining agreements trump the ADA—not under a reasonableness analysis
but rather under an interpretation of what it means for a job to be vacant.277
Under the heading of “[t]he existing job must be vacant,” the court stated
that “an existing position would not truly be vacant, even though it is not
presently filled by an existing employee, if under a collective bargaining
agreement other employees have a vested priority right to such vacant positions.”278 Rather than interpreting collective bargaining agreements under
the “reasonableness” requirement, Midland Brake finds their limitation under
the “vacant” term of the statute.279 Meanwhile, both Barnett and United Airlines II mention collective bargaining agreements in some capacity,280 suggesting that they should be interpreted under the “reasonableness” language
of the statute. In fact, Barnett explicitly rejects that a seniority system should
be analyzed under the term “vacant”: “Nothing in the Act, however, suggests
that Congress intended the word ‘vacant’ to have a specialized meaning.
And in ordinary English, a seniority system can give employees seniority
rights allowing them to bid for a ‘vacant’ position.”281
However, neither Barnett nor United Airlines II actually decides whether
all collective bargaining agreements would ordinarily make ADA reassignment unreasonable.282 Further, even if collective bargaining agreements
were to make reassignment unreasonable “in the run of cases,” Barnett, as
emphasized in United Airlines II, would refuse to make the exception—or any
exception—to the reassignment requirement categorical. In such a way,
plaintiffs should have an opportunity to challenge at least one categorical
limitation in Midland Brake under the Barnett reasonableness analysis as interpreted in United Airlines II, and United Airlines II provides the plaintiffs the
opportunity to analogize collective bargaining agreements to the left side of
the spectrum.
Under the categorical limit, Midland Brake explained that “other important employment policies besides . . . [those] under a collective bargaining
agreement” might “make it unreasonable to require an employer to reassign
a disabled employee to a particular job.”283 Midland Brake contemplated “a
well entrenched seniority system which, even though not rooted in a collective bargaining agreement, is so well established that it gives rise to legitimate
expectations by other, more senior employees to a job that the disabled
employee might desire,” rendering reassignment unreasonable “at least

277 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403–406 (2002); United Airlines II,
693 F.3d at 764–65.
281 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 399.
282 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
283 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1175–76.
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under some circumstances.”284 The Tenth Circuit then further stated that
“[t]here may be other such important employment policies that it would not
be reasonable for an employer to set-aside in order to accomplish reassignment of a disabled employee,” though the court did not “attempt . . . to
itemize all such policies that may exist nor comment upon such policies
which may be so fundamental to the way an employer does business that it
would be unreasonable to set aside.”285
That is, the Tenth Circuit had clearly stated that collective bargaining
agreements, at least some seniority systems, and potentially other policies
could trump ADA reassignment. Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit emphasized “the relative rarity of seniority systems,”286 and only after emphasizing
that the first step of the Barnett analysis should not be difficult when considering a best-qualified policy did the Seventh Circuit admit the following: “[W]e
suppose it is possible there is some comparable circumstance [to a seniority
system] of which we are unaware.”287 It is not clear whether the court meant
that it is possible that there are other circumstances in this case of which the
court was unaware or other circumstances generally, in the universe. Further,
the court did not seem to explicitly address the fact that United Airlines policy was to allow for some preferential treatment in competing for a position.288 Though dicta, perhaps plaintiffs could use this omission to argue
that even best-qualified policies with some preferential treatment cannot
trump mandatory reassignment. The court also emphasized that even if reassignment was not reasonable in the run of cases, the plaintiff could still prove
it was reasonable under the particular circumstances of the case.289 In short,
while Midland Brake explicitly stated that policies other than seniority systems
and collective bargaining agreements might trump reassignment, United Airlines II only admitted with reluctance that other employment policies might
compare to seniority systems (though such systems are rare and the court was
unaware of such comparable policies at least in this case, and perhaps in
general), giving plaintiffs strong language with which to work. Midland Brake
cites many other categorical limitations on the scope of the ADA reassignment obligation, including that “[r]eassignment is limited to existing jobs
within the company,” “[r]eassignment does not require promotion,”
“[e]mployers may choose the proffered reassignment,” “[e]mployer[s] need
offer only a reassignment as to which the employee is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation,” and “ ‘[u]ndue hardship.’ ”290 Some subse284 Id. at 1176. Here, Midland Brake quotes Aka for its proposition that “[a]n employer
is not required to reassign a disabled employee in circumstances when such a transfer
would violate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy of the employer.” Id. (quoting Aka v.
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (internal quotations
omitted).
285 Id.
286 United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012).
287 Id. at 764 n.3.
288 Id. at 761.
289 Id.
290 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1174–78.
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quent cases seem to suggest that there are still basic limitations to the
meaning of reassignment, including that a position is vacant and that a new
position need not be created.291 Therefore, it is still possible that some categorical limitations to reassignment may still exist. However, Barnett and
United Airlines II leave open the possibility that the classifications of former
categorical limits to reassignment may be reconsidered, at least with regard
to other employment policies—as seems to have been done with the consideration of collective bargaining agreements.292
Midland Brake also explains that reassignment “is [l]imited by the
[m]odifier of [r]easonableness.”293 The court seems to incorporate this limitation into some of its “[s]pecific[ally] [listed] [l]imitations on an
[e]mployer’s [d]uty to [r]eassign.”294 For example, under the limitation
that “[a]n employer need not violate other important fundamental policies
underlying legitimate business interests,” the court states the following:
“Because reasonableness is our guide, there may be other important employment
policies besides protecting rights guaranteed under a collective bargaining
agreement that would make it unreasonable to require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a particular job.”295 The court also explicitly
states after its explanation of “reasonableness” and as an introduction to its
list of “[s]pecific [l]imitations on an [e]mployer’s [d]uty to [r]eassign,” that
“[t]he scope of Midland Brake’s obligation to offer Smith a reassignment
position is further constrained by some of the broadly accepted limitations
on an employer’s duty to reassign that have evolved under ADA case law in
our circuit and others.”296 Thus, it seems that Midland Brake contemplates
that reassignment may be even further limited by the “reasonableness”
requirement than the specific limitations which it has listed. Meanwhile, Barnett seems to suggest and the Seventh Circuit seems to assume that reasonableness is the guide to determining whether a particular employment policy
should trump the ADA in the run of cases. Barnett and United Airlines II have
also helped to provide some definition to reasonableness—which Midland
Brake failed to define. However, Barnett provided a two-step rebuttable presumption step for reasonableness, but still did not clearly define what would
make a reassignment policy “reasonable” or “unreasonable” “in the run of
cases.” United Airlines II guaranteed that the definition would be relatively
plaintiff-friendly, suggesting that a policy must closely resemble seniority systems, which are relatively rare and implicate property-rights and administrative concerns. Conversely, a plaintiff could argue that a policy more closely
resembles a best-qualified policy.
291 See Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 7 F. Supp. 3d 526, 550 (D. Md. 2014).
292 Cf. Wicks, supra note 11, at *4 (summarizing the state of employment policies affecting reassignment since United Airlines II).
293 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1171 (emphasis omitted).
294 Id. (emphasis omitted).
295 Id. at 1175–76 (emphasis added).
296 Id. at 1171 (emphasis omitted).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL310.txt

2015]

5.

unknown

Seq: 35

providing plaintiffs with tools

2-MAR-15

14:30

1407

Subsequent Cases

Though the point of this Note is not to discuss the circuit split specifically, it is worth mentioning that it does not appear that other circuits have
addressed best-qualified reassignment policies since United Airlines II. The
circuit court cases that do cite Barnett mostly do not address reassignment.297
a.

Some Circuit Court Cases Have Applied the Reasoning of Barnett
to Non-Reassignment Accommodations

In Hwang v. Kansas State University,298 the Tenth Circuit applied some of
Barnett’s reasoning regarding inflexible seniority systems to inflexible leave
policies at issue in the case and under the Rehabilitation Act.299
The case emphasizes some language from Barnett that may be useful for
plaintiffs rejecting that inflexible leave policies can be immune from
attack300—and United Airlines II may be able to supplement this helpful language. The case also emphasizes that Barnett can be applied both to Rehabilitation Act cases and to accommodations other than reassignment.301
Barnett has also been applied to other forms of accommodation as courts
continue to work out the meaning of “reasonableness.” In Jones v. Nationwide
Life Insurance Co.,302 the plaintiff requested but was denied a time extension
for taking a test because his employer was not made aware of his disability
and because the requested accommodation was unreasonable. The plaintiff
had requested the accommodation too late and had not shown that the
accommodation “ ‘would enable [him] to perform the essential functions of
[his] job.’ ”303 The court cited Barnett for the proposition that it was the
plaintiff’s “burden to demonstrate that his requested accommodation
‘seem[ed] reasonable on its face’ ”—which the plaintiff failed to do.304
In Solomon v. Vilsack,305 the court cited Barnett in a plaintiff-friendly manner under the Rehabilitation Act, regarding an accommodation request for a
maxiflex schedule.306 Because the reasonableness analysis is context-dependent, “it is rare that any particular type of accommodation will be categorically unreasonable as a matter of law. This case is no exception.”307 Citing
various authorities, it found that “an ‘open-ended’ or maxiflex schedule”
297 See infra subsection III.C.5.
298 753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014).
299 Id. at 1164.
300 See id. at 1162–65.
301 See id. at 1161–64.
302 696 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012).
303 Id. at 90 (alterations in original) (quoting Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d
121, 136 (1st Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
304 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,
401–02 (2002)).
305 763 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
306 See id. at 9–10.
307 Id. at 10.
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could not be “ ‘unreasonable as a matter of law’ ”308 and that here, the plaintiff had “discharged her summary-judgment duty of coming forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in her favor on all four elements
of her accommodation claim.”309
b.

Other Cases Cite the Ninth Circuit’s Barnett Opinion

Other cases do cite Barnett, and one of those cases—Cardenas-Meade v.
Pfizer, Inc.310—does address reassignment, but it only does so in dicta after
dismissing the claim because the plaintiff was not disabled.311 The court
quotes the Ninth Circuit’s Barnett opinion for the idea that “[e]mployers
‘who fail to engage in the interactive process in good faith [ ] face liability . . .
if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible.’ ”312 It then
quoted pre-Barnett decisions from other circuits to explain the following:
But while a reasonable accommodation under the ADA does include “reassignment to a vacant position,” requests for re-assignment to a new supervisor are disfavored. While it is appropriate to consider the reasonableness of
such a request on a “case-by-case” basis, there is a “presumption . . . that a
request to change supervisors is unreasonable, and the burden of overcoming that presumption (i.e., of demonstrating that, within the particular context of plaintiff’s workplace, the request was reasonable) therefore lies with
the plaintiff.” Here, given that Cardenas–Meade was in a probationary initial training period as an employee and had already failed the required final
examination, it is not clear that the benefits of such a transfer would have
outweighed the associated administrative costs.313

United Airlines II might be useful for arguing against such a presumption in
the Seventh Circuit.
c.

Some Cases Continue to Try to Determine What May Be
Considered a Reasonable Transfer

Some cases continue to attempt to determine what a reasonable transfer
may be. For example, Rorrer v. City of Stow314 found that a transfer could not
be considered unreasonable merely because the plaintiff could not fulfill all
of the duties of a particular job description, where the duties which the plaintiff is unable to fulfill are not actually a necessary part of the job315: “The
City’s unwillingness to modify a job description to accommodate Rorrer,
308 Id. at 11 (quoting Solomon v. Vilsack, 845 F. Supp. 2d 61, 72 (D.D.C. 2012)).
309 Id. at 12.
310 510 F. App’x 367 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
311 See id. at 370–72.
312 See id. at 372 (alterations in original) (quoting Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d
1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated sub nom. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S.
391 (2002)).
313 Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (citing the Seventh, Second, and
Third Circuits).
314 743 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2014).
315 See id. at 1040–45.
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even though that modification would not have required any change in job
duties, falls short of the City’s obligation ‘to locate a suitable position’ for
Rorrer after he identified a vacancy and requested a transfer.”316
The Fifth Circuit presents an apparent limitation to transfer: “[I]t would
not have been reasonable for the GSA to search for a replacement position
until it knew for sure when Murry would be returning from her
incapacitation.”317
d.

Cases Citing United Airlines II

The United Airlines II opinion has, to this point, been cited in several
cases. In three cases, United Airlines II was cited only for its standard in cases
completely unrelated to ADA reassignment.318 In four other cases, its holding has not been cited substantively.319 In EEOC v. Midwest Independent Transmission Systems Operator, Inc.,320 the court used the Barnett analysis as stated in
a Third Circuit case—and quoted by United Airlines II—in a non-reassignment reasonable accommodation analysis, namely, analysis of “[a] lengthy
leave of absence.”321
In Selan v. Valley View Community Unit School District 365–U,322 the court
noted that the defendant had “originally argued that the ADA did not
require it to transfer [the Plaintiff],” but that since the time of that brief,
United Airlines II
reversed our Court of Appeals’ prior position by announcing that court’s
unanimous holding “that the ADA does indeed mandate that an employer
appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are
qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer.”323
316 Id. at 1045.
317 Murry v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 519 F. App’x 866, 869 (5th Cir. 2013).
318 Kane Cnty. Personnel, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 13 C 8800, 2014 WL 2609799, at *3
(N.D. Ill. June 11, 2014); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 13 C 2207,
2014 WL 1018115, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014); Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Virtual Imaging,
Inc., No. 12 C 9201, 2013 WL 6382988, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2013).
319 Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 533 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the
district court had cited Mays, which was abrogated by United Airlines II); Jennings v.
Panetta, 492 Fed. App’x 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff “was barred
from filing a civil suit in federal court until either the EEOC issued a final decision or 180
days had passed” and citing Mays, which had been abrogated by United Airlines II); Chi.
Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Thorne Assocs., 893 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(quoting the standard for dismissal as “[t]he complaint is read ‘in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible
inferences in [the non-movant’s] favor’” (alteration in original) (quoting United Airlines II,
693 F.3d 760, 761–62 (7th Cir. 2012))); Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Alma Lasers, Inc.,
No. 12 C 4978, 2012 WL 4120506, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2012) (citing the same
standard).
320 No. 1:11-cv-1703-WTL-DML, 2013 WL 2389856 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2013).
321 Id. at *4; see United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 763 n.1.
322 No. 10 CV 7223, 2013 WL 146415, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2013).
323 Id. at *10 n.10 (quoting United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 761).
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Therefore, the defendant instead argued that there were no available vacant
positions for the plaintiff, and the court decided that there was “a genuine
issue of material fact as to” that point.324
In Rouse v. Chicago Transit Authority,325 United Airlines II was not used
directly. Addressing a Rehabilitation Act “failure-to-transfer” claim, the court
cited a Third Circuit case—after finding that the Seventh Circuit had not
addressed the elements of a failure-to-transfer case—in holding that a plaintiff in “a failure-to-transfer case . . . ‘bears the burden of demonstrating: (1)
that there was a vacant, funded position; (2) that the position was at or below
the level of plaintiff’s former job; and (3) that the plaintiff was qualified to
perform the essential duties of this job with a reasonable accommodation.’ ”326 United Airlines II was only cited within a failure-to-modify claim for
the proposition that “[d]iscovery ultimately may belie Plaintiff’s allegations
by, for example, demonstrating that accommodating Plaintiff’s request would
have posed an undue hardship on [the Chicago Transit Authority].”327
The Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County328 district court made clear that
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “shall be judged by the same standards
as those used for Title I of the ADA.”329 Under that analysis, the court cited
United Airlines II in a paragraph that described the accommodation of reassignment and some “traditional” limitations, such as only resorting to reassignment if accommodating the employee in his “current position” would
pose an undue hardship,330 for the following proposition: “If the employee
can be accommodated by reassignment to a vacant position, the employer
must offer the employee the vacant position.”331 The court also cited Barnett
for its two-step “reasonableness” test, which reconciled the terms “reasonable
accommodation” and “undue hardship.”332
The employer in this case had transferred each member of a particular
department to a particular new position except one blind employee, due to
computer program inaccessibility.333 The blind employee selected a position
from other opportunities offered by the employer; when the employee
applied for the other position, she was interviewed but not selected.334
Regarding the position to which her colleagues were transferred, it was
unclear whether the court was evaluating that failure as a failure to transfer
or a failure to accommodate.335 In any case, the plaintiff was found to have
324 Id. at *10.
325 No. 13-cv-05260, 2014 WL 3810876 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2014).
326 Id. at *7 (quoting Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2000)).
327 Id. (citing United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 762).
328 7 F. Supp. 3d 526 (D. Md. 2014).
329 Id. at 546 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2012); see Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th
Cir. 1995)).
330 Reyazuddin, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
331 Id. (citing United Airlines II, 693 F.3d at 761).
332 Id. at 545–46.
333 Id. at 534.
334 Id. at 535–38.
335 See id. at 543–52.
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shown “at least a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s proposed
accommodation [of a particular widget to make the computer program
accessible] permits her to perform the essential functions of the . . . job,”336
but the defendant was found to have shown an undue hardship defense.337
The court found that the plaintiff was offered other positions as a reasonable
accommodation when she was not placed in the new position with her colleagues and that plaintiff “chose not to apply” for numerous subsequent
vacancies.338 The fact that the plaintiff did eventually apply and compete
for—but was denied—another position was evaluated under a disparate
impact analysis, rather than a failure to accommodate.339 If instead the
claim had been evaluated as a failure to accommodate claim, it would have
been interesting to see how United Airlines II would have been applied to what
seemed to be an employment policy requiring the plaintiff to apply for consideration for vacant positions. This case may demonstrate two things as the
Seventh Circuit moves forward after United Airlines II: (1) that United Airlines
II may be applied in Rehabilitation Act cases, and (2) that the Seventh Circuit still maintains some clear parameters limiting the reassignment requirement besides “reasonableness.”
In Rednour v. Wayne Township,340 the court quoted both Barnett and
United Airlines II for the Barnett two-step reasonableness test.341 Regarding a
request for a temporary light-duty position, the plaintiff was found to have
“met her initial burden of showing that [such] reassignment . . . may constitute a reasonable accommodation to her disability.”342 It seems that the Seventh Circuit is still working out the reasonableness of light-duty positions: “At
least in the context of injuries suffered on the job, the Seventh Circuit has
held that ‘our case law and the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADA have
approved of an employer’s offer of light-duty assignments as a reasonable
accommodation.’ ”343 While indefinite accommodations are considered to
be “an unreasonable request of an employer,”344 the court emphasized that
“there exists considerable middle ground between a two-to-four week period
and a truly ‘indefinite’ one.”345
One of the most extensive uses of United Airlines II has been in Kosakoski
v. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.,346 where the Eastern District of Penn336 Id. at 548.
337 Id. at 549.
338 Id. at 551.
339 See id. at 553–61.
340 No. 1:13-cv-00320-SEB-DKL, 2014 WL 4754816 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2014).
341 Id. at *11.
342 Id. at *12.
343 Id. (quoting Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 696 (7th Cir. 1998);
cf. Reyazuddin, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 550 (stating “nor is the employer required to reallocate
essential job functions or assign an employee to ‘permanent light duty’” (citing Carter v.
Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987))).
344 Rednour, 2014 WL 4754816, at *14 (citation omitted).
345 Id.
346 No. 12-cv-00038, 2013 WL 5377863 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2013).
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sylvania decided that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment
when the plaintiff claimed she had not been reasonably accommodated
through reassignment, and the defendant had “a policy of hiring the most
qualified applicant for the position and [argued] that plaintiff would have to
go through the same process as any external candidate.”347 First, the court
rejected the defendant’s reliance on Huber,348 stating that “the Huber Court
relied significantly on the decision in [Humiston-Keeling], which was expressly
overruled in [United Airlines II].”349 The court then used United Airlines II
and a Third Circuit case to show that “[n]ormally, a request for reassignment
is a reasonable accommodation request,” that “[t]herefore, in this case, after
plaintiff requested that she be reassigned based on her disability, and positions became available for which plaintiff was qualified, defendant had the
burden to show that such reassignment would cause an undue hardship,”350
and that “a ‘best-qualified selection policy’ does not categorically amount to
an undue hardship for an employer.”351 Kosaki was obviously influenced by
the United Airlines II analysis, but continues to show the confusion of whether
employment policies should be considered under a reasonableness or undue
hardship analysis. United Airlines II has been applied, but plenty of ground
remains for plaintiffs to use United Airlines II to clarify the meaning of reasonableness in the reassignment context.
CONCLUSION
United Airlines II has certainly contributed to various circuit split conversations, including (1) whether best-qualified selection policies trump ADA
reassignment, (2) the proper borders and applications of the Barnett decision, and (3) the meaning of reasonableness, at least in the reassignment
context. However, the real significance of United Airlines II comes in its use
by plaintiffs—plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit in particular, and possibly in
other circuits as well. First, United Airlines II directly overturned employerfriendly precedent in the Seventh Circuit that had upheld that best-selection
policies could trump the ADA reassignment requirement—abrogating Mays
and overturning Humiston-Keeling. Second, United Airlines II helped to temper what could have been a relatively strong blow to plaintiffs in Barnett. Barnett has rejected the suggestion of the plaintiffs that a showing of
“reasonableness” was nothing more than a showing of the “effectiveness” of a
proposed accommodation for the employee with a disability. The Barnett
Court rejected this notion and instead created a two-step analysis with rebuttable presumptions in which the “reasonableness” analysis—for which the
plaintiff was responsible—had to carry some weight. The plaintiff must show
that reassignment was reasonable when considering other circumstances of
347
348
349
350
351

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *15–17 (citation omitted).
at *16.
(citations omitted).
at *17 (citing United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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employment “ordinarily” or “in the run of cases” or, if unable to do so, show
particular circumstances that make a presumptively unreasonable accommodation reasonable in these particular circumstances. Only if the plaintiff is
able to make one of these showings will the defendant be required to show
undue hardship. The Court also clarified that undue hardship and reasonable accommodation were not “mirror images”352—undue hardship concerned the operation of business353—but the Court did not clearly define
the parameters of “reasonableness.” It did hold, though, that the plaintiff
had to show that reasonableness,354 and set a rebuttable presumption border—never categorical, as the plaintiff could show particular circumstances355—that seniority systems made reassignment unreasonable in the
run of cases.356
In light of this decision, United Airlines II helped to regain ground for
plaintiffs. It set another rebuttable presumption border: best-qualified selection policies cannot trump reassignment absent a showing by the defendant
of undue hardship. It also emphasized that even seniority systems cannot
create a per se exception under the Barnett approach. The Seventh Circuit
did not clarify the middle ground between best-qualified selection policies
and seniority systems; the court was also unclear regarding whether collective
bargaining agreement fit into the analysis, where they fit into the analysis, or
whether they always trump mandatory reassignment. Other circuits continue
to try to work out this middle ground as well.357 However, by setting the
other end of the presumption spectrum, United Airlines II has provided plaintiffs going forward with a means to argue reasonableness regarding the
accommodation or reassignment. That is, plaintiffs can argue that a particular employment policy is more like a most-qualified selection standard than a
seniority system standard. Even further, United Airlines II provides useful language for plaintiffs to argue that a particular policy is not like the “narrower,
fact-specific exception” of a seniority system358 and language “reject[ing]
[an] “anti-preference interpretation of the ADA.”359 Even with a seniority
system, United Airlines II emphasized that the exception was not per se;360 a
plaintiff can even look to the Barnett opinion itself for examples of circumstances which might render a seniority system unfit for exception—for ideas
or even for comparison.361 United Airlines II may even leave ground for
employee-plaintiffs to challenge some of the categorical limitations of reassignment stated in Midland Brake. Through all of the presumption borders
352 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).
353 Id. at 400–01.
354 See id.
355 Id. at 405–06; see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
356 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.
357 See supra subsection III.C.5.
358 See United Airlines II, 693 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2012).
359 Id. at 763.
360 Id.
361 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405–06.
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and circumstantial exceptions regarding the reasonableness of a reassignment accommodation under the ADA, the Seventh Circuit has helped to clarify borders and provided plaintiff-friendly language for future litigation.

